Response to your article: "Is Somali unity possible without political seriousness?

Dear Dr. Abdifatah Ismael Tahir,

I read your article, titled "Is Somali unity possible without political seriousness? A response to Abdirashid Hashi?” with great interest.

I appreciate your deep insight in exposing Somaliland’s grievances and Somalia’s superficial arguments.

Had people like you been part of the Somalia–Somaliland negotiations, we might have seen some progress.

However, as you may recall, Western university dropouts—often portrayed as experts (aqoonyahan)—have dominated Somali politics. As a result, they have had very little grasp of what was truly at stake. Their argument for Somali unity has largely centered on two things: asserting authority over Somaliland by claiming legal ownership of Somali unity, and politically and economically alienating Somaliland, while attempting to encircle it with Turkish, Chinese, and Egyptian naval presence. At times, they have even gone so far as to require members of the Somaliland diaspora to obtain e-visas from Mogadishu to visit their own homeland. This, ultimately, was the last straw that broke the camel’s back.

I, too, believed in Somali unity in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, when I realized that Somali leaders’ arguments amounted to little more than lip service—repeating hollow slogans such as "We are the same people,” "Ethiopia is our enemy,” and "We will have a president from Somaliland rule Somalia”—it became clear to me that it may take generations before Southern Somalis awaken from this political stagnation.

As you have eloquently pointed out, the Somalia–Somaliland conflict did not begin on December 26, 2025, when Israel recognized Somaliland. Its roots go back to 1960, when Somaliland—then with a functioning administration—joined Somalia by bringing the blue flag to Mogadishu and uniting without any pre-attached conditions.

Before they even left Mogadishu, Somaliland leaders realized they had drawn the short end of the stick. They returned empty-handed: "Sidaan kuugulisay iigumaad hambayn.”

In 1961, they attempted a coup to reclaim their sovereignty, but instead of addressing Somaliland’s grievances early on, their efforts were suppressed.

From 1961 to 1990, many in Somaliland felt occupied, unable to recognize themselves in government institutions. They effectively became minorities in their own land. As General Morgan detailed in his "Letter of Death,” there were even plans to resettle millions of people from the Ogaden region into Somaliland.

Fast-forward to the period between 1991 and 2025: once again, Mogadishu had an opportunity to resolve Somaliland’s grievances once and for all. Yet, it reverted to the same approaches you outlined in your article.

From 2026 onward, one might expect Mogadishu to change its strategy toward Hargeisa. Instead, it continues to seek external actors to coerce Somaliland into another forced union—a "gunshot marriage,” so to speak. In essence, Mogadishu keeps reinventing the wheel of state failure.

I strongly believe that Somaliland’s recognition could be a blessing in disguise for Somalia. Somalia has long remained on the periphery of the Arab world, and that reality persists. Somaliland, however, could help stabilize the region by mediating between Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab. It could also serve as a safe haven for Somalis in the diaspora who wish to return and invest in their homeland.

Ultimately, if Al-Shabaab refuses to lay down its arms, a coordinated effort between Somaliland and Somalia could potentially eliminate the threat altogether.

Thank you,

Faisal Deria, [email protected]